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In his little book The Morality of Law, Lon Fuller relates an
allegory about a King Rex who sets out to reform the legal system of
his kingdom. Upon assuming the throne, King Rex repeals all existing
law and, lacking the confidence to write a new code, begins the process
of developing new rules on a case-by-case basis.
In this way under the stimulus of a variety of cases he hoped that
his latent powers of generalization might develop and, proceeding
case by case, he would gradually work out a system of rules that
could be incorporated in a code. Unfortunately the defects in his
education were more deep-seated than he had supposed. The
venture failed completely. After he had handed down liteally
hundreds of decisions neither he nor his subjects could detect in
those decisions any pattern whatsoever. Such tentatives toward
generalization as were to be found in his opinions only com-
pounded the confusion, for they gave false leads to his subjects
and threw his own meager powers of judgment off balance in the
decision of later cases. 1
In the allegory, King Rex eventually dies, "old before his time and
deeply disillusioned with his subjects." 2 In the real world, the King
is still with us, enthroned in the legal department of a federal regu-
latory agency.
But although the King may feel secure for the present, his subjects
are getting restless. Consumer groups are no longer so certain that
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Ph.B.
1931; J.D. 1934, Loyola University (New Orleans).
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2. Id. at 38.
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the Federal Trade Commission acts in the public interest when it
grants and denies secret merger clearances according to no ascertain.
able standards. Welfare mothers are beginning to wonder about the
life and death power which a single social worker wields over them
without any realistic possibility of restraint or review. Poor people
no longer believe that something about the natural order makes it
inevitable that the criminal laws be enforced against them, but not
against white collar criminals who daily victimize them. There is the
smell of revolution in the air.
I
Now Professor Davis, in his powerful manifesto Discretionary Jus-
tice,3 has proposed that we modify King Rex's powers, turning him
into a constitutional monarch. Davis argues that the administrative
system in this country is shot through with unnecessary discretion.
The police, prosecutors, and petty bureaucrats in our local and na-
tional governments are free to run loose in an Alice-in-Wonderland
of unchannelled, unreviewable, untrammelled discretion. The result,
unsurprisingly, is a crazy quilt of secret, ad hoc decisions which are
essentially lawless, because they are presently beyond the power of
law to control. Professor Davis has the temerity to suggest that this
is an intolerable situation in a country theoretically dedicated to equal
justice under law. He then proceeds to provide a series of specific
suggestions for how administrative discretion can be checked or chan-
nelled and made subject to binding, prospective rules. This is not to
say that he argues for complete elimination of discretionary decision-
making. He would not exchange Lewis Carroll's fantasy for Franz
Kafka's nightmare. A tyranny of petty bureaucrats who lack power to
change the rules even an iota in order to do justice is at least as bad
as a tyranny of petty bureaucrats who make up the rules as they go
along.
But the need for some discretion in no way justifies the vast scope
of unnecessary discretionary authority which is harbored in our present
administrative apparatus. While an agency is new and unfamiliar
with the subject matter with which it is dealing, it may have to feel
its way around for a while on a case-by-case basis. But from the very
beginning, the agency should concentrate considerable attention on
3. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969) (paper cd. 1971)
[hereinafter cited to page number only].
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the problem of developing coherent general principles to guide its
decisions. As soon as such principles can be formulated, they should
be publicly discussed and, if found satisfactory, set down in the form
of binding rules. If the agency is still too uncertain to issue a com-
plete set of rules, it should promulgate them for areas which have
become well settled. If general rules to cover all cases are impossible,
specific rules to cover identifiable sub-categories of cases should be
issued. If the agency feels unable to do even this much, then it should
be compelled to explain publicly the reasons for its inability to formu-
late prospective rules in a specific class of cases, and it should utilize
other devices such as fair informal procedures, effective review by
superior officers, and nonbinding policy statements to ensure that
individual decisions are not arbitrary and capricious. The underlying
tone of Discretionaiy Justice is optimistic: although there may be a
hard core of decisionmaking which must remain discretionary, there
is nothing intractable about most of the problem. If we have the will
to create an effective system of law to guide and channel administrative
decisionmaking, then the monster can be tamed.
II
The real question, of course, is whether we have the will. Professor
Davis subtitles his book "A Preliminary Inquiry," and that caveat
should be taken seriously. Davis has brilliantly and systematically laid
bare the soft underbelly of the American legal system. Moreover, he
has tentatively outlined means by which the most important abuses
of discretionary power can be curbed. He is at his most convincing
when he argues that "the procedure of administrative rule-making
is . . .one of the greatest inventions of modern government,"4 and
his solution follows plainly: "the chief hope for confining discretion-
ary power... [lies] ... in much more extensive administrative rule-
making."5 An interlocking network of rules, laid out in advance, can
serve as a bulwark which strengthens the agency and prevents co-
optation by the forces which it is attempting to regulate. The absence
of rules has too often meant that the agency is at the mercy of the
pressures brought to bear on it, its decisions little more than the
resulting vector produced by conflicting political and economic forces.0
4. P. 65.
5. P. 55.
6. See Shapiro. The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HLv. L. REv. 921, 952 (1965).
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But while Professor Davis' perception of the problem is clear,
when it comes to outlining methods by which agencies can be forced
to make rules and to obey the rules they do make, he barely scratches
the surface. This is a shortcoming which leaves Davis' work seri-
ously flawed. He seems to suppose that many agencies will suddenly
see the error of their ways. In his view, "the chief hope for con-
fining discretionary power" lies in voluntary agency rule-making. If
that is true, there may be no hope at all. For the sad fact is that
powerful forces are at work which incline agencies toward an ad hoc,
case-by-case mode of operation. The first of these is simply the bureau-
cratic imperative of keeping the wheels turning. As Professor Jaffe has
written,
[t]ime has corrected one dearly held illusion. It was thought in
the heyday of the New Deal that an operating administrative
agency, because of its continuous exposure to the problems of an
area, was ideally fitted for progressive planning and programming.
We have found that such is not the case. The agency is so deeply,
so anxiously involved in solving the problems of the moment that
most of its effort goes out in keeping astride of its operating
agenda. Furthermore, buffeted by strong, opposing forces, it looks
for compromise, expediency, and short-term solutions. After its
first strenuous years of conflict with those whom it must regulate,
it may arrive at a modus vivendi which it looks upon and pro-
nounces to be good.7
Once this accommodation is reached, the agency is sheltered from
the scrutiny of Congress, the courts, and the public. It seems clear
that the amorphous, ad hoc mode in which most agencies operate has
made them resistant to congressional control. Of course, some agencies
are notoriously vulnerable to a well-timed telephone call from a
congressman or a threat from a powerful committee chairman. But
these are essentially ad hoc devices to deal with ad hoc decisions. Most
of the time they reflect the sort of constituent pressure from private
interest groups which has too much effect on agency decisions already.8
In the aggregate, all of the individual calls from congressmen and
threats at appropriations time do not add up to systematic congres-
7. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL Co rJoL or ADMINiSTRATIVE AcrioN 51 (1965).
8. The late Senator Dirksen's intervention in administrative affairs for the benefit
of individual constituents, and his vociferous defense of this practice, are notorious. He
once remarked, "I have been calling agencies for 25 years. . . . Are we to be put on the
carpet because we represent our constituents, make inquiries, and find out what the status
of matters is, and so serve our constituents?" 105 CONG. REC. 14057 (1959).
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sional control at the policy level. The ineluctable fact is that all too
often there can be no congressional supervision of agency policy be-
cause the agency has no policy to supervise. Congress will never be
able to influence the directions in which agencies are heading until
the agencies begin to head in some direction and stop floundering
in the morass of case-by-case litigation.
Moreover, ad hoc decisions tend to leave the agency freer to change
direction at will and allow it to avoid the risks inherent in advance
commitments. 9 As Professor Shapiro has pointed out, a reviewing
court which might declare invalid a clearly promulgated regulation
may well affirm the application in a particular case of a principle of
adjudication based on past agency decisions.10 In addition, an agency
will be more readily permitted to ignore its past principles of adjudi-
cation than to depart from its regulations."
Given this historical and legal context, it is unrealistic to suppose
that many agencies will dramatically move to confine their own dis-
cretion. Fortunately, however, there are other strategies available to
implement Professor Davis' plans for administrative reform of ex-
ecutive agencies. The publication of Discretionary Justice coincides
with the culmination of a number of trends in American thought-
trends which can be utilized to make the Davis solution something
more than an unrealizable ideal. On the one hand, there has been a
growing sense of disillusion with the role which regulatory agencies
play in the political and economic processes of the country. Credit
for the genesis of these critiques must go to conservative economic
theoreticians who yearn for a return to a free market economy and
-view administrative intervention as officious intermeddling 2 But
the sense of disillusion has spread throughout the political spectrum,
and critics from the right and left now generally agree that many
regulatory agencies are inept, inefficient, and overly protective of the
interests which they are supposed to regulate.13
9. There may also be something to Professor Jaffe's observations: "The question may
be asked whether there is not an essential conflict of attitude between the task of
adjudication and long-range planning. The former may be thought to intensify the
sense of the particular to a degree which makes planning appear inexact, insensitive,
Utopian, and futile." JAFFE, supra note 7, at 20.
10. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 944-47.
11. Id. at 947-52.
12. See, e.g., M. FRtmtA, CArrALis1I AND FRa-oo.%t 119-60 (1902).
13. See, e.g., Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970); F. Cox, R. FELLMMr ,
& J. SCHULZ, "THE NADE. REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE COassssios (1969); MeyerS,
The Root of the FTC's Confusion, in PUBLIC PoLiciEs AND TIuR PoLms 104-09 (R.
Ripley ed. 1966).
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On the other hand, we have seen in the last few years a dramatic,
if still incipient, reassertion of congressional power which poses the
first serious challenge to the practical supremacy of the executive
branch since the early days of the New Deal. This movement began
with congressional frustration over the inability of the legislature to
affect the conduct of the Vietnam war. It has quickly spilled over,
however, into numerous other areas. The right of the executive to
impound appropriated funds and to impose sweeping wage-price con-
trols without congressional guidance has recently come under chal-
lenge. More and more legislators have come to realize that the so-
called "expertise" of the executive branch is in reality no more than
a cloak which hides the raw exercise of untrammelled power. Whereas
once it was believed that administrative "experts" could magically
provide a "scientific" solution to public policy problems,14 many
congressmen now realize that most questions of policy are questions
of values, and that the people must determine for themselves the
values which they favor. In time, the movement for greater balance
between the legislature and the executive promises to bring about
the first substantial reallocation of power in almost two generations.
III
It is possible that these overlapping movements toward a reassertion
of congressional power and away from blind trust in administrative
competence will, of their own force, produce voluntary reform. Indeed,
there is some evidence that a few agencies--notably the Federal Trade
Commission;--are already responding to public pressures and chang-
ing their ways. But for the reasons outlined above, I think it would
be foolish to rely too heavily on voluntary conversion. Fortunately,
such reliance is unnecessary. A side effect of the trends toward con-
gressional power and distrust of administrative activity has been the
discovery of a counter-tradition which favors close supervision of
administrative agencies. This counter-tradition-long overshadowed
by the mainstream infatuation with administrative expertise-is sup-
ported by a number of legal doctrines which could serve to force
reluctant administrators to conform their actions to prospective, pub.
licly promulgated rules and standards.
14. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 9-12 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
LANDIS].
15. See Osborne, The Nixon Watch: Reform at the FTC, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 2,
1971, at 13-15; Osborne, The Nixon Watch: Reform at the FTC-II, Oct. 16, 1971, at
10-11.
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The reform of administrative procedure is a large task, and Congress,
the agencies, and the courts all have roles to play. Congress should
control discretion by reassuming its rightful role as the architect of
fundamental administrative policy. Its current discontent with the
consequences of excessive delegation could best be translated into a
practice of approving only those statutes which set standards sufficient-
ly precise to ensure that the relevant agency receives clear signals re-
garding the policy it is expected to carry out. Congressional insistence
on such clarity would also give the courts a workable standard for
review, and-of great importance-enable congressmen to monitor
more effectively the performance of executive agencies. Administrators
should take their cue from Congress and the courts and move to
confine their own discretion. The courts should control discretion by
vigorously reasserting their inherent role as the interpreters of legis-
lative enactments and guardians against invidious and irrational ex-
ercises of governmental power. They must repudiate the dictum of
Gray v. Powell, which still seems to satisfy the Supreme Court:
"Where, as here, a determination has been left to an administrative
body, this delegation will be respected and the administrative conclu-
sion left untouched.""' This attitude has led to the practice of sustain-
ing any order of an agency which colorably has kept within the bounds
of the statute'7-- an unjustifiable abdication of the responsibility of
judicial review.
But while all branches of government must join in the fight to
limit discretion, I believe it is the courts which will have to bear the
primary burden. Not only must the courts, on occasion, formulate
rules of their own which will limit discretion. They must also resusci-
tate the legal principles which will force sometimes reluctant congress-
men and administrators to take action. The courts cannot bear the
burden alone; they are not equipped to act as super-administrators,
formulating individual rules to govern the thousands of cases heard
daily by agencies. But they can reestablish the doctrines which were
16. 314 US. 402, 412 (1941).
17. See, e.g., Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.
of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951); FCC v.
WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945);
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). Of course, there is also a counter.tradition
that favors active judicial review of agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Burlington Truck
Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167 (1962); Secretary of Agriculture v. United States,
347 U.S. 645, 653 (1954); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comen, 301 U.S. 292
(1937). In fact, it is the thesis of this piece that this counter-tradition can be used to
build an effective system of constraints against administrative arbitrariness. The only
point I wish to make here is that in recent years the requirements of administrative
consistency and rationality, while not abandoned, have been frequently observed in
the breach.
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designed to compel or encourage other branches of government to
assume their parts of the task. Some of these doctrines are outlined
below.
A. The Congressional Role: The Delegation Doctrine
It is a commonplace that, in its entire history, the Supreme Court
has invalidated only two statutes on the ground of improper delegation
of power.' Today, most scholars rank the delegation doctrine together
with substantive due process, nullification, and common law forms
of action as arcane notions which inexplicably fascinated an earlier
generation but which were given the decent burials they deserved
long ago. Indeed, even Professor Davis rejects the delegation doctrine
as a realistic means of subjecting agencies to the rule of law. "What
Congress says in some such statutes is, in effect: 'We the Congress
don't know what the problems are: find them and deal with them.'
In many circumstances this is sound government. And the determina-
tion of whether or when it is sound government is primarily for
Congress to decide."19
Yet, at the risk of seeming antiquarian, I think the reported demise
of the delegation doctrine is a bit premature. To be sure, we can all
join in rejecting broad formulations of the doctrine, such as the
famous statement in Field v. Clark: "That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution. ' 20 But one can reject this extreme posi-
tion without conceding that Congress should be permitted, in effect,
to vote itself out of business. There must be some limit on the extent
to which Congress can transfer its own powers to other bodies without
guidance as to how these powers should be exercised.
No judge of any federal court has specifically disavowed the dele-
gation doctrine in its entirety,21 and numerous decisions can be cited
18. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238 (1936).
19. P. 48.
20. 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). See also United States v. Shreveport Grain &¢ Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
21. Even Professor Davis, while correctly arguing that de facto standardless delegations
have been permitted, concedes that "[t]he courts keep repeating and repeating that the
exercise of delegated power must be guided by meaningful safeguards even when the
delegated power is carefully circumscribed and even when the intent to delegate Is based
upon a fully-considered judgment that the delegation is necessary and desirable ... 
K. DAVis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 50 (1970 Supp.).
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which reaffirm it as at least a theoretical check on standardless shifts
of power. -2 As recently as 1963, three Supreme Court Justices found
that
[t]he delegation of . . unrestrained authority to an executive
official raises, to say the least, the gravest constitutional doubts.
... The principle that authority granted by the legislature must
be limited by adequate standards serves two primary functions
vital to preserving the separation of powers required by the Con-
stitution. First, it insures that the fundamental policy decisions
of our society will not be made by an appointed official but by
the body immediately responsible to the people. Second, it pre-
vents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at large
by providing the courts with some measure against which to
judge the official action that has been challenged.2
In 1967, a fourth Justice argued: "Because the statute contains no
meaningful standard by which the Secretary is to govern his designa-
tions, and no procedures to contest or review his designations, [it] is
constitutionally insufficient to mark 'the field within which the [Sec-
retary] is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within
it in compliance with the legislative will.' "24
Moreover, the delegation doctrine continues to be applied-albeit
in somewhat erratic fashion-by numerous state courts, 25 and it has
even proved a useful tool in some special situations in recent federal
cases.26 1 think the delegation doctrine retains an important potential
as a check on the exercise of unbounded, standardless discretion by
administrative agencies. At its core, the doctrine is based on the notion
that agency action must occur within the context of a rule of law
previously formulated by a legislative body. That concept is as im-
29. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 585, 593 (1963); Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
23. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., with Stcwart and
Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted: original emphasis).
24. United States v. Robel 389 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring), quot-
ing from Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944). It must be conceded that Mr.
Justice Brennan would apparently restrict his application of the delegation doctrine to
cases where protected freedoms and criminal sanctions are invohed. See 389 U.S. at 276.
25. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Pennsylvania R. R., 41 Ill.2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152
(1968); Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 164 N.E.2d 389, 196 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1959). But
see, e.g., Kugler v. Yocum, 69 Cal.2d 371, 445 P.2d 303, 71 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1968); Warren
v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 313-14, 353 P.2d 257, 261 (1950).
26. Thus, on occasion, the Supreme Court has been willing to imply a standard in
order to save the statute from an unconstitutionally broad delegation. See, e.g., Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Schneider
v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
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portant now as it was a century and a half ago when it was first
propounded.
27
In the end, Professor Davis rejects the delegation doctrine as a
means of controlling administrative discretion because, in his view,
it is impractical. He reads the long history of the doctrine as conclu-
sively demonstrating that the legislature either cannot or will not
impose meaningful standards on administrative discretion. "[T]he
emphasis," he says, "should not be on legislative clarification of
standards but on administrative clarification, because that is where
the hope lies.1128 Moreover, he contends, legislative standards might
not be desirable even if the legislature could be persuaded to provide
them. There are times, Davis argues, when the legislature does not
really know what it wants or when political pressure makes it impos.
sible for it to accomplish its objectives. In these situations, if the job
is to be done at all, it will have to be done by an agency under a broad
delegation of discretionary authority.20
It seems to me both of these arguments are open to serious question.
When Davis complains that the delegation doctrine has not solved
the problem of discretionary power, he is heaving boulders from the
none-too-safe haven of a rather fragile glass house. Discretionary Jus-
tice would not have been written if agency rule-making-"where the
hope lies"-had provided a solution. As argued above,8 0 there are
substantial reasons why agencies are unlikely to be persuaded that
they should make fuller use of their rule-making power. Congress,
on the other hand, seems to be in a mood to reassert some of its long
dormant prerogatives. There is every reason to believe that, with a
slight nudge from the courts, Congress would eagerly reassume its
rightful role as the author of meaningful organic charters for admin-
istrative agencies.
Davis is not quite so vulnerable when he argues that at times the
congressional will may not be clear enough to permit formulation of
a specific set of standards under which the agencies should operate.
When Congress is too divided or uncertain to articulate policy, it is
27. I am thus in accord with Judge Friendly's vicw that "[w]e still live under a
Constitution which provides that 'all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives'; even if a statute telling an agency 'Here is the problem: deal with it' be
deemed to comply with the letter of that command, it hardly does with the spirit." H.
FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIvE AGENCIES 21-22 (1962).
28. P. 50 (original emphasis).
29. Pp. 46, 49. In this respect, Davis seems to be in agreement with some of the strong
advocates of administrative discretion. See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 14, at 51.
30. See pp. 578-79 supra.
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no doubt easier to pass an organic statute with some vague language
about the "public interest" which tells the agency, in effect, to get
the job done. But while this observation is no doubt correct, it seems
to me to argue for a vigorous reassertion of the delegation doctrine
rather than against it. An argument for letting the experts decide
when the people's representatives are uncertain or cannot agree is an
argument for paternalism and against democracy. 31 As Justice Brennan
has argued,
[f]ormulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, en-
trusted to it by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates
authority under indefinite standards, this policy-making function
is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive
in the same degree to the people.32
The whole reason we have broadly based representative assemblies
is to require some degree of public consensus before governmental
action occurs. To be sure, we pay a price for awaiting such consensus.
Sometimes desirable action is delayed or becomes impossible al-
together because the representative organs of government are too
fragmented or uncertain to formulate a coherent policy. But our ex-
perience with broad delegations such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
makes clear that there is a price to be paid for congressional abnega-
don as well.
Ultimately, the arguments for broad delegation rest on the illusion
that problems are solved by conflict avoidance. Congress, for one
reason or another, cannot deal with a problem, so it passes some "soft"
statutes which throw the mess into the lap of an administrative agency.
Such a broad delegation can yield only two possible results, both of
which are unfortunate. On the one hand, if the problem is really
intractable, it is unlikely that the agency, with all its expertise, wiU
do any better with it than Congress. Indeed, if there is political op-
position to any contemplated action, the agency may actually be more
vulnerable than Congress.33 In this situation, the agency is likely to
act like King Rex-blundering along on a case-by-case basis without
any discernible direction or purpose. Alternatively, it is possible that
31. "'[Taking things out of politics' [means] taking things out of popular control.
This is a frequent device of special-irterest groups to effect the transfer of governmental
power away from the large public to the special-interest small publics.' J. ArrLEY,
POLICY AND ADmINISTRATION 162 (1949).
32. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
33. "Where Congress has not been able to formulate a consensus, we cannot expect
the politically weaker agency to do much better." JAFE, supra note 7, at 25.
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the agency will be able to deal with the problem forcefully. It may
be that the agency is sufficiently insulated from political pressure so
that it can take action which would have been unavailable to Congress,
or that Congress is badly split while the agency is united.3 4 In this
situation, a strong agency will be able to formulate prospective rules,
develop a clear sense of purpose, and minimize unnecessary discretion.
But these goals will have been accomplished at the expense of demo-
cratic decisionmaking. The putatively substantial portion of the elec-
torate which opposes the agency action, or which is merely uncertain
as to its wisdom, is likely to believe-and with some justification-that
Congress has done through the back door what it could not accomplish
in direct, democratic fashion. 35
We have recently seen enough evidence of what happens when a
substantial number of people come to believe that major decisions
have been made without their consent. If the social fabric is to survive,
the politics of manipulation and delegation simply must be replaced
by a politics of informed consent. It is perfectly natural for congress-
men to attempt to avoid or delay substantial conflict by any device
available, including broad delegations of power to the executive
branch. But it is time we came to realize that in a democracy conflict
over basic policy cannot be avoided and that when too long delayed
it may, like Langston Hughes' dream deferred, explode.
None of this is to argue that a revitalized delegation doctrine is
likely to emerge easily and completely. There are severe problems in-
volved in the development of a coherent, principled, and meaningful
34. See LANDIS, supra note 14, at 51-55.
35. It is ultimately impossible to talk sensibly about administrative law outside the
framework of a theory of democratic government. Such a theory would determine how
loud a voice the citizenry should have in various kinds of decisions. Using criteria derived
therefrom, one could then go about labelling certain decisions as properly legislative,
others as administrative, judicial, and so forth. I do not propose, even if I could do
so, to put forth such a theory, for it would sweep far broader than this review requires.
But the core of the argument may be stated. I have argued elsewhere that the Constltu.
tion deliberately places certain decisions-notably those affecting minority rights--
outside the domain of the majority and its elected representatives. Wright, Professor
Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 787-88
(1971). Precisely because of this restriction, it is all the more necessary that those matters
reserved for majority decision be done through majoritarian process. It is in this sense
that legislative decisions are democratic: unlike a judge, whose decisions purport to be"principled," a legislator may trade off a vote on one question for the support of a
colleague on another issue of greater importance to his constituents; decisions are made
by vote, with the winning side presumably representing a greater number of citizens.
Most important, legislators are subject to electoral control. The justification for the
very existence of a bureaucracy, whose members go about their jobs regardless of who
wields elective power, is that legislators simply lack the time and expertise to administer
the laws they have made. Civil servants are supposed to give effect to the legislators'
decisions, not make those decisions for them. Thus their only legitimate pollcymaking
role is the interstitial application of the always imperfectly defined legislative will.
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theory of delegation. Delegation is, after all, a matter of degree, and
the amount of power which it is permissible to delegate to an agency
varies with the problem involved.30 As Professor Davis points out,
some decisions, by their very nature, are more subject to control by
prospective rules and standards than others. It would be a fairly simple
matter, for example, for Congress to specify with a great deal more
precision what exactly it wishes the Federal Communications Com-
mission to do in order to equalize access to the electronic media. Yet
it is hard to imagine how Congress could go beyond the vaguest sort
of standards to control ratemaking by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. It will be necessary to do some systematic thinking about the
degree to which various categories of problems are subject to pros-
pective congressional control. We need, in short, some standards for
when we should require standards. To be sure, the overall standard
is clear enough: Congress should channel its delegations of power
with prospective guidelines and standards to the greatest extent pos-
sible. But ironically, the courts may have to work out the precise
contours of the requirement of prospective standards on an empirical,
case-by-case basis, and this process is likely to be time-consuming. In
the meantime, I am convinced that Congress can be persuaded to do
a great deal more than it is doing now, as a matter of constitutional
morality if not constitutional compulsion.
B. The Administrative Role: A Rule-making Requirement
If the courts are able to formulate a coherent delegation require-
ment or if Congress proves willing to assume a more active supervisory
role voluntarily, many of the problems of unnecessary discretion will
be resolved. But this proposition should not be taken to derogate from
Professor Davis' thesis. Even if Congress assumed its full responsibility
and began writing meaningful organic charters for administrative
agencies, those bodies would still have to be given substantial power
36. I am thus in basic agreement with Dean Landis when he says: "Generalization as
to the allowable limits of administrative discretion is dangerous, for the field is par-
ticularly one where differences in degree become differences in substance. It is possible
to say, on the one hand, that the responsibility for fashioning a policy, not only of
great economic importance but also one that has divided the faith and loyalt) of classes
of people, cannot appropriately be intrusted to the administrative; on the other that
the scope of administrative power should not be so narrowly defined as to take away
from the administrative its capacity to achieve effectively the purposes of its creation.
Such corollaries, however, are meaningless in the abstracL It is problems alone that can
give them content, but the content that they should possess must have reference to
situations seen in the light of the weaknesses and strength of administrative responsi-
bility." LANDIS, supra note 14, at 55.
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to resolve individual controversies. The problem, as Professor Davis
correctly perceives it, is to force the agencies to exercise that power
through purposeful and coherent prospective rules rather than in the
random, ad hoc, and secret manner in which they all too frequently
operate at present. Once again, it seems to me the legal tools which
could be utilized to reach this goal have already been fashioned. All
we need do is bring those tools to bear on the problem in a forceful
and determined manner.
Chief among these tools is the due process clause of the Constitution.
It should be obvious that to have due process of law it is necessary
for the decision involved to be subject to law. Yet when we say a
decision is ad hoc, random, or unreviewable we mean in effect the
decision is lawless. As Professor Fuller has stated with admirable di-
rectness: "The first desideratum of a system for subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules is an obvious one: there must
be rules."' ' 7
It is time, then, we came to recognize that in at least some circum-
stances there is a due process right to have one's conduct governed
by rules which are stated in advance.38 Moreover, these rules must be
clearly formulated and publicly promulgated. These requirements
have been recognized for centuries in the area of criminal law. No
one would contend that a man could be arrested, tried, and convicted
of a "crime" for acts which were perfectly legal at the time they were
committed. 39 Moreover, it has long been recognized that a criminal
statute must be publicly promulgated and written precisely enough
to give fair warning.40 Similarly, when noncriminal regulation borders
on constitutionally protected conduct, the courts have repeatedly held
that the statutes involved must be precisely drawn so as to make clear
what is lawful and what is not before the conduct in question takes
place.4
1
37. FULLER, supra note 1, at 46.
38. See, e.g., Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968);
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Atkins, '323 F.2d 733,
742 (5th Cir. 1963). Cf. Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 139-41 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 881 (1966); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804, 815-16 (E.D. Ark. 1967), vacated
on other grounds, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). See generally DAVIS, supra note 21, at
58-62.
39. See, e.g., Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 381 (1879); cf. Rosenberg v. United
States, 346 U.S. 273, 290, reconsideration denied, 346 U.S. 324 (1953).
40. See, e.g., Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); Cline v. Frink
Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927). See generally Note, The Void.For.Vagueness Doctrine
in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
41. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147 (1939); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). See generally Note, The First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970).
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As an abstract proposition, few would argue that these requirements
are limited to the areas of criminal law and constitutional rights.
Imagine, for example, a system where individual social workers are
given the unfettered right to grant and deny welfare benefits to
whomever they please on whatever basis they please. Or imagine a
system under which a man's right to pursue his chosen occupation
depends upon his ability to get approval from a board which gives
no hint of when it will give such approval and when it will withhold
it. Is it really open to question that such schemes would be unconsti-
tutional? Regulatory systems which operate without rules are inher-
ently irrational and arbitrary. The purpose of such a system is pre-
sumably to bring primary conduct into conformance with agreed
upon societal norms. Yet a system operating without rules cannot
possibly achieve this goal, since the people being regulated are not
informed of what the societal norms are. Unless they are prescient,
they cannot possibly be expected to mold their conduct in accordance
with rules which, if they can be said to exist at all, are created after
the conduct occurs. 42
Moreover, it should be apparent that any system which operates
without rules chills the exercise of constitutional rights. When a
court strikes down a vaguely worded statute providing for licensing
of public demonstrations, it presumably does so because the statute
permits those charged with administering it to make decisions on the
basis of criteria which are forbidden by the First Amendment.43 Yet
precisely the same flaw is inherent in the statutory schemes described
above. A social worker administering a standardless public assistance
program might deny benefits because the applicant is a Black Panther.
The medical board described above might withhold a license to an
otherwise qualified physician because he belongs to the Republican
Party. It might be argued that these possibilities do not in themselves
make the schemes unconstitutional but rather only demonstrate that
they are subject to abuse. When the individual abuses come to light,
the argument goes, they will be corrected. But the trouble with a
standardless regime is that the abuses may never come to light. In a
system under which government officials do not have to act in ac-
cordance with publicly stated rules, it is very difficult to know when
they are acting in accordance with secret, illicit rules.44
42. See FUu aE, supra note I, at 46-65.
43. See Note, supra note 41, at 857.
44. The slaughter at Attica and the series of prison revolts which followed in its
wake-notably at prisons in Norfolk and Walpole, Massachusetts and Rahway, Newr
589
The Yale Law Journal
When these propositions are baldly stated, they seem obvious to
the point of triteness. Yet the sad fact is that we have barely begun
to apply these fundamental due process precepts to the millions of
discretionary decisions made by government officials every day. Wel-
fare workers do exist who possess the de facto power to grant or deny
benefits as they choose.4 5 Government boards do control access to
various professions without reference to any discernible criteria.
0
Indeed, even in the area of criminal law, where the necessity for pros.
pective rules is most widely recognized, police, prosecutors, judges,
and parole officers continue to arrest and incarcerate people on the
basis of standards which are apparent only to themselves. 47 Under a
criminal justice system which makes such conduct as petty gambling,
possession of marijuana, statutory rape, and abortion criminal of-
fenses, a large proportion of the population becomes criminal. When
the law enforcement establishment picks and chooses on an ad hoc
basis which of these "criminals" are to be arrested and prosecuted,
they are in effect making up the criminal law as they go along, in a
manner which suits the whims and prejudices of individual policemen
and prosecutors. 48 Similarly, when a judge decides to impose a maxi-
mum sentence or a parole board denies release without a statement
of reasons, they make the degree of punishment subject to considera-
tions which were not publicly explicated at the time the offense was
committed.
49
There is simply no reason why we should go on pretending this
sort of ex post facto lawmaking by administrative fiat is constitutional.
It cannot be doubted that most agencies possess the lawful authority
to decide most of the cases which they in fact handle. But the fact
that an agency is within the bounds of the relevant statutes in acting
Jersey-have focused public attention on the governance of prison institutions. In no
area is the need for public ventilation and public rule-making more compelling. A few
recent cases indicate that the courts are aware of this need. See Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,
451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Smith
v. Robbins, 328 F. Stipp. 162 (D. Me. 1971); Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 139.41
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 881 (1966); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D.
Ark. 1967), vacated on other grounds, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
45. Pp. 180-83. Discretionary Justice was written before the Supreme Court decided
that welfare recipients were entitled, under the due process clause, to an evidentlary
hearing according them "rudimentary due process" before their benefits could be takent
away. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). But neither Goldberg nor any subse.
quent decision does anything to check the abuses Professor Davis describes.
46. P. 38.
47. For an argument that the police have a constitutional duty to formulate rules,
see Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. Rie. 785, 813-15 (1970). Cf. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
48. See Pp. 188-91.
49. See Pp. 126-41.
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has never been thought sufficient, by itself, to insulate its decision
from judicial review. The decision must not only be lawful-it must
be lawfully made as well."o Indeed, that is what the due process clause
is all about. As argued above, one element of a lawfully made decision
is that it accords with previously stated and clearly articulated rules.
Thus, in a proper circumstance, it is clearly within the power of a
reviewing court to insist as a matter of constitutional law that the
agency state prospective rules and standards before its decision will
be enforced.51
Moreover, even if the reviewing court is not willing to go this far,
there are several subconstitutional devices available to force adminis-
trative agencies into rule-making. In some circumstances, for example,
it may be possible to extrapolate a rules requirement from the statute
under which the agency operates. When Congress sets up an adminis-
trative agency, it provides guidelines which concern not only what
decisions the agency is to make but also how those decisions are to
be arrived at. True, Congress rarely states explicitly that the agency
must act through rule-making rather than adjudication. But, as argued
below,52 reviewing courts need not be reticent about putting meat on
vague congressional language concerning the "what" of agency de-
cisions. In proper circumstances, I believe, a court can construe con-
gressional intent as to the "how" of these decisions as well. In a
situation where an agency is capable of proceeding by rule-making
rather than adjudication and where ad hoc decisionmaking is not a
rational means of tackling the problem, a court would be justified
in concluding that this mode of proceeding was not in accord with
the purpose of the statute which the agency is administering.5 Indeed,
given the strong constitutional considerations outlined above,54 such
a conclusion fits neatly with the more general maxim that courts
should construe congressional enactments so as to avoid serious con-
stitutional question.55
50. See, e.g., Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comni'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937);
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Folkways Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 3751 F.2d
299 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
51. See note 47 supra.
52. See pp. 595-96 infra.
53. See Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952), holding that, while the Labor
Board had the power to disbar an attorney from practice, Congress did not intend for
this power to be exercised on a case-by-case basis. Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), holding that Congress intended for the Board to determine
the requirements of good faith bargaining on a case-by.case basis rather than by formu.
lating per se rules.
54. See pp. 588-91 supra.
55. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Gutknecht v. United States,
396 U.S. 295 (1970); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953).
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Finally, even if the reviewing court rejects both the constitutional
and the statutory theories for a rules requirement, there remain some
situations in which the court can exercise its own inherent supervisory
powers to force the agency to write rules governing its conduct. Thus
if the police are destroying evidence, or preserving it, only in a random
fashion, the courts can require police authorities to formulate rules
governing the precise disposition of potential evidence in a variety of
situations.00 Similarly, when an agency handles a recurring problem
on an ad hoc basis despite the fact that a normative standard could
easily be devised, courts can and should require rule-making on the
basis of their inherent supervisory powers. 7 These powers are derived
from the underlying power of the courts to protect the integrity of
judicial review. No one has ever questioned the authority of a court
sitting in equity to issue orders designed to preserve a res which is
sub judice.58 I believe courts have a similar power to require analogous
measures which make judicial review of agency action possible. Since
it is obvious that judicial review cannot exist unless there is a standard
against which agency action can be measured, the courts have the
authority to demand that such a standard be erected. As Judge Bazelon
has argued,
judicial review alone can correct only the most egregious abuses.
... When administrators provide a framework for principled de-
cision-making, the result will be to diminish the importance of
judicial review by enhancing the integrity of the administrative
process, and to improve the quality of judicial review in those
cases where judicial review is sought. 9
It is clear, then, that when agencies refuse to make use of their
rule-making powers, the courts need not take "no" for an answer.
Under well established principles of law, the courts have the authority
to demand that agency action be subject to rules. This is true because
it is what the Constitution requires, because it is what Congress often
intends, and because it is what the courts must do if they are to
preserve their reviewing function. But, whatever theoretical pigecn-
hole is chosen, it is ultimately true because fair procedures are impos-
sible without rules which guide agency action. We cannot have a
56. See United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
57. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
58. See, e.g., Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & 1'ac.
Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935); Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922).
59. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 459 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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society under law without first having laws. The judiciary fulfills its
highest obligation when it insists not only that the laws be obeyed
but also that there be laws to be obeyed.
C. The Judicial Role: Review Without Rules
Having said all this, I should hasten to add a caveat. I do not intend
to adopt what Professor Davis has called the extravagant version of
the rule of law.0° Advocates of discretionary decisionmaking can argue
with some force that there is a value in flexible, empirical growth of
the law and that the rules for resolving some problems are for one
reason or another simply not susceptible to neat codifications.
My view is that these arguments are correct as far as they go, but
that they are essentially incomplete. While I do not wish to dispute
the proposition that in some situations comprehensive prospective
rule-making is impossible or undesirable, I share Professor Davis'
view that a great deal more can be done. The criminal justice system
provides an excellent example. It is doubtless true that the decision
to prosecute or not to prosecute a suspected offender is a complex one
and it would be a mistake to require the determination to be made
in accordance with totally inflexible rules.0' But this is not to say
that prosecutorial discretion cannot be significantly narrowed without
interfering with the sort of individualized justice that empirical de-
cisionmaking is designed to protect. Studies of prosecutorial decision-
making reveal that the decision to prosecute is based at least in part
on a number of factors which are quite readily generalizable, such as
the amount of evidence available and the likelihood of conviction.02
I see no reason why these relatively straightforward considerations
cannot be stated in the form of prospective rules so that they can be
judicially enforced and fairly applied.
Of course it is true that even after this has been done there will
remain aspects of prosecutorial decisions which cannot be put in the
form of binding, prospective rules. Some of these considerations will
be too individual in nature to be generalized beyond the one case to
which they apply. Others are more general in nature, but involve
decisions as to allocation of prosecutorial resources which, if publicly
60. Pp. 28-353.
61. Cf. Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal versus the Real, 23 Pun. An. Ru'. 140
(1963). But see pp. 162-70.
62. See F. M=RLER, PROSECUTIoN-THE DECISION TO CARGE A SusPECT WImt A Cm.tE
24-43 (1970).
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announced, might encourage criminal conduct.03 But the important
point to be made is that, although in some situations it may be im-
possible to formulate prospective rules governing official conduct, it
does not follow that unbridled discretion should reign supreme. Al-
though publicly announced prospective rules should be the preferred
method of limiting agency discretion, there are other methods as well.
These alternative methods once again derive from basic notions
about what courts are supposed to do in a constitutional democracy.
One of their underlying functions is to ensure that official action is
not irrational or invidious. The Administrative Procedure Act clearly
empowers courts to set aside agency action which is "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law,"04 or which is "contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity."'oa Thus even in situations where the agency cannot
articulate a rule in advance, the courts should still oversee agency
action to ensure that the agency is following some rational and per-
missible rule of decision. While it is sometimes inevitable that the
rule of decision be developed on a case-by-case basis, this development
should not be confused with a system under which decisions are made
without rules.0 6 When the prosecutor chooses to press charges in one
case but not in another, for example, he should be able to point to
some distinction between the two cases which it is permissible for
him to consider. While he may not be able to articulate in advance
what all the distinguishing factors in all cases will be, he must at
least be able to show later that cases treated differently were in fact
different in some relevant respect-that is, that he is following some
sort of rational, non-discriminatory rule. If he cannot make such a
showing, his different treatment of the two cases is irrational or in-
vidious, and hence violative of equal protection."7
Moreover, there are certain evidentiary principles which guard this
63. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 6, at 928-29.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1970). It is, of course, true that the Administrative Procedure
Act also precludes from review "agency action [which] is committed to agency discretion
by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970). But in my view Congress should not be taken as
having given agencies discretion to act in an arbitrary, irrational, or unconstitutional
fashion. See Balanyi v. Local 1031, International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs., 374 F.2d 723, 726
(7th Cir. 1967). Cf. Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Connitted
to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REV. 367, 370 (1968).
66. "It should . . . be emphasized . . . that the choice between rulcmaking and
adjudication is not necessarily the choice between the articulation of a rule and an ad
hoc approach in which each case is governed only by a general statutory provision.
Agencies, like courts, frequently evolve detailed and precise rules in the course of adjudi-
cation." Shapiro, supra note 6, at 926.
67. Cf., e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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requirement of rationality. For example, if the prosecutor has, over
a period of time, been charging only blacks with certain crimes despite
the fact that white violators are also brought to his attention, this
means that his basis for prosecution, however stated, is inherently
suspect 8 and that courts will scrutinize the reasons offered for the
apparently invidious discrimination with particular care.G0
To be sure, none of these notions is particularly new or revolution-
ary. Indeed, they are the core concepts upon which equal protection
doctrine is built. I offer them here only to demonstrate that methods
are available to control agency discretion even in cases where pros-
pective rule-making is impossible. Nor need these methods always
involve constitutional adjudication. Even in situations where the
agency is able to offer plausible reasons for distinguishing between
different cases, it is still possible for the courts to limit the scope of
agency choice. The administrative agencies, after all, derive all of their
delegated power from statutes passed by the legislative body, and it
is the task of the courts to interpret those statutes in cases which are
properly brought before them.
Once again, the Administrative Procedure Act is quite explicit:
"To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the review-
ing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or ap-
plicability of the terms of an agency action."7" If the agency acts
beyond its statutory authority as the relevant statute is interpreted by
the courts, the agency action must be reversed.7'
The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with
administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordi-
narily that construction will be affirmed if it has a 'reasonable
basis in law.' ... But the Courts are the final authorities on issues
of statutory construction . . . and 'are not obliged to stand aside
and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions that
they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate
the congressional policy underlying a statute.'.... 'The deference
owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip into a ju-
dicial inertia ... '72
68. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
69. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US. 356 (1886).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).
71. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841. 850.52 (D.C. Cir.).
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Mary Carter Paint Co. v. FTC, 333 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.
1964).
72. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1958). quoting from
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944). See also NLRB v. Brown. 380
U.S. 278, 291 (1965); American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965).
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Of course many congressional delegations are phrased in extremely
broad terms and, literally read, they permit an exceedingly wide range
of agency choice. But the very breadth of such statutes provides an
argument for a narrowing judicial construction in accordance with
congressional intent.73 Advocates of administrative discretion seem to
forget that the courts construe broad statutory mandates all the time
-that indeed, the courts have no choice but to do so when faced with
the problem of applying a vaguely worded statute to a specific set of
facts. As Professor Jaffe has said,
[t]he scope of judicial review is ultimately conditioned and de-
termined by the major proposition that the constitutional courts
of this country are the acknowledged architects and guarantors
of the integrity of the legal system .... An agency is not an island
entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the magnificent
mansion of the law. The very subordination of the agency to ju-
dicial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each
agency is to be brought into harmony with the totality of the law;
the law as it is found in the statute at hand, the statute book at
large, the principles and conceptions of the 'common law' and the
ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.74
It may nonetheless be true that in situations where the agency sets
out to limit and define its own mandate by adopting prospective rules
to guide it in consideration of individual cases, the courts have some
obligation to respect agency expertise. But when the agency has de-
faulted-when it purports to do no more than follow the vague
statutory mandate without additional prospective rules of its own-
the courts have no obligation to respect undemonstrated or hypo.
thetical expertise. Instead, the reviewing court should look at the
statute on its own and determine for itself whether the agency de-
cision is within the congressional purpose. In this way, judges can
narrow the scope of agency discretion even if the administrators are
unwilling to narrow its scope themselves.
IV
Justice Jackson argued years ago that
administrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to
this point-it is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commis-
sion in the exercise of its discretionary powers under and within
73. See Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 166-68 (1962).
74. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 589-90.
596
Vol. 81: 575, 1972
Beyond Discretionary Justice
the law. It cannot be invoked to support action outside of the law.
And what action is, and what is not, within the law must be de-
termined by courts, when authorized to review, no matter how
much deference is due to the agency's fact finding. Surely an ad-
ministrative agency is not a law unto itself .... 5
Mr. Justice Jackson wrote those words in a dissenting opinion. His
warning was not heeded in that case, and it has gone largely unheeded
to the present day. Because of that neglect, we are now surrounded
with agencies that are in fact laws unto themselves. The well-inten-
tioned reformers of another generation have created a monster which
threatens to destroy our very system of law.
And yet, although the danger is real, I cannot help sharing the
underlying optimism of Professor Davis. Administrative discretion
was created by law, and there is no inherent reason why the law
should be unable to control it. The legal devices which we could use
for this purpose were all formulated years ago and remain perfectly
serviceable. Professor Davis and others have alerted us to the peril,
and a broad public consensus is beginning to coalesce in favor of
doing something about unbridled and arbitrary administrative power.
If that consensus is properly marshalled and the legal tactics carefully
planned, King Rex can indeed be turned into a constitutional mon-
arch. Failing that, we may still be able to pull off a bloodless coup
d'etat and send the King packing to a land that does not purport to
govern its affairs by rules of law.
75. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 532 US. 194, 215 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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